

#2



D.E.--HARVARD LECTURE #2

September 28, 1983

I will give a preview of what we are going to be covering, at the cost of giving away suspense on some of this material, and maybe I'm saying some things tonight that I believe, from past experience, will sound incredible, very hard to believe. Unless your experience is unusual, it will evoke a good deal of resistance on your part to my interpretations, or even to some of the data. I may overlap from last time because I can't remember what I said last time. This time I am awake, I am present

There are psychological problems that I hope we will not only address, but may come up with some new hypotheses, some new guesses about how humans behave in certain situations. Existing theories for the kind of behavior I will be describing are not yet adequate, although I think Kelman in fact goes a good part of the way. It's a very unusual article, describing an explanation for some of this.

From that point of view, the nuclear arms race material we are discussing could be thought of as a case study for psychological theorizing. The reason it seems so urgent to develop new understandings of this phenomenon is that we seem to be in a situation of great peril, many people think so (and I believe this is true). I believe part of the reason for that is because not only what is happening is little known, much of it is secret, but even to those who share the secrets, it is inadequately understood. We urgently need to understand these processes so that we can change them rather rapidly.

The idea that the world is a perilous place because of nuclear weapons is very widely shared in the world. We have become conscious that these are shared fears, because of the polls, the referenda, which tell us that 70% of our public disbelieve our president's policies of a continued arms race as a path to our security. 70% would like to see our president at least try to end the arms race, in ways which he has not done. This opposition to presidential policy is unusual in such a widespread way, and bespeaks an unusual degree of concern and a critical attitude toward U.S. policies. Obviously, then, as somebody who is working to change the arms race, I am part of a very large movement here, and I have no sense that my long run concern about it is different from most of the people who answer the polls that way.

Let me underline one thing right now that may not have been obvious from last week's talk, which was nothing but bad news, as I recall. I wouldn't be doing what I do, which is partly teaching, partly acting and demonstrating, lobbying and letter-writing, if I didn't believe that there was a possibility of averting these dangers and reducing the risks. I am not merely walking the streets saying "the end is nigh," as though this were inevitable. My own activity should indicate that whatever you hear me say, I don't in fact think the situation is hopeless, nor do I think that it is beyond our ability to change. It is not my intent nor my inner meaning to convey a sense of despair, of hopelessness. In fact, that would be the opposite effect from what I want, and it doesn't convey what I really think about the situation.

At the same time, I find that I am acting, not more hopelessly,

than many friends of mine, many associates, who share pretty much the same political values and even share a concern about the nuclear arms race, but don't seem to feel that the short run and the mid run are quite as critical as I seem to think. Why am I doing more this month, more this year, than friends of mine who are no less conscientious about this and yet seem somewhat more deliberate in the actions they seem to think are appropriate? They are looking at a longer time scale for changing this than I am. ^PI've asked myself that at various times. And I have become aware, then, of some subtle differences in my perspective which I want to make clear here because it will explain why I am presenting some of the material I am presenting. I would like you to understand my perspective, whether or not you agree with it.

By questioning some of these people, I have come to realize that they see the dangers in the nuclear era as coming from the two-sided process of the U.S. and S.U. that is largely out of control, out of human control. They see many dangers of accident, unauthorized actions, subordinate actions which might be false alarms (which could have happened in the S.U., for example, with the K.A.L. jet)--mistakes of various kinds that make the world a dangerous place when the mistakes can lead to the use of nuclear weapons. They worry about proliferation and the possibility that the bombs will get into the hands of people much less "responsible" than the people at the the head of the S.U. and U.S. However critical we may be of the Soviet leaders, we see them as people who came up through a complicated political process which made them fairly prudent, cautious, calculating. And however worrisome Reagan can sound, we are reassured that in practice he doesn't act so precipitously as one might fear. So the worry is that the bombs will get into the hands of people who are

are represented to us as being highly unstable. Khadaffi is represented in that light. Idi Amin is a favorite example of someone who can indeed get bombs eventually. So people worry about that sort of thing in the future.

I worry about all those things too. They are all, in fact, real dangers. But I find that I am led to worry about some things my friends do not worry as much about, in addition to those things. That is: presidents of the kind we have elected in the past (no worse, no different) may in fact initiate the use of nuclear weapons deliberately in given situations that may, in fact, rise. And they may do so as the result of long-laid plans, preparations to do so, that make it easy and seem to make it reasonable at that time, or inevitable. Moreover, Soviet leaders of the kind that we have seen in the past could do the same. This seems to be an increasing possibility because of new trends in the situation. And the interaction of these two possibilities even increases the likelihood that one or the other may eventually do this. In fact, I see these risks as somewhat greater than the other risks--large as they are.

That leads to another aspect in which I see the risks more urgently than some. It is true that the bomb is in the process of spreading. That is likely, in the next few years if current policies do not change, to expand quite rapidly. That prediction has been made before, and it didn't come true. But there are reasons to think that this is the decade it will come true. I think the way to bet at this point is that unless there is a rather rapid and quite dramatic noticeable change, of a kind you won't miss, in the general policies of the superpowers, other powers will be

acquiring nuclear weapons quite soon. Some of those may indeed get into what look like very irrational hands. Others will go to the hands of those who look no more irrational than our past presidents. What I am saying is that my understanding of the behavior of our past presidents and their planning tells me that these other leaders--indeed, a multiplicity of leaders--may get close to using the bomb in combat, without being any crazier than any president we've ever elected--with very likely catastrophic results.

I should say right away that it is not my expectation that the first use of such a weapon must, or is even highly likely to, explode into all-out use. Some people believe that in the anti-nuclear movement. But in a way, there is a kind of reassurance to that notion. They think it is so obvious that they really find it hard to imagine any leader would use such a weapon, because it would obviously blow up the world. Presidents have not believed that in the past, and I think situations will arise when other leaders will not believe that a single, small, limited use of a nuclear weapon must escalate. And they will have reason for disbelieving that. It will not be a random, off-the-wall kind of expectation. That is why they are more likely to use it. If they really believed what some of these anti-nuclear people believe--that they would inevitably be blowing up the house when they did it--then they wouldn't. But they don't believe that. And they are probably right. Any such use could blow it all up, and over time it is hard to believe that weapons could be used for very long without in fact triggering a massive escalation. My nightmare--which is unfortunately one of the more probable futures I can imagine--is that we will before long find ourselves in an era of small nuclear wars, an era of some significant duration. More than months? Probably. A few years, probably. Maybe a decade or more, in which weapons are used, either by a superpower or by small powers against each other, in distant wars, in limited ways, in ways which do not reach global or hemispheric escalation, but which are genocidal. It is very hard to use nuclear weapons except at sea or in space or in deserts (and those may be the

first regions in which nuclear weapons are used)...But it is very hard to use nuclear weapons in any area of the earth's surface with any human population on it without it being genocidal, regionally genocidal.

I have said this is a nightmarish future for me because I think that the first time a nuclear weapon is used, if it doesn't blow up everything....Many people hope that that will shock everybody into an awareness of our dangers and into a whole new form of political activity. I am very doubtful about that, but let me just mention one alternative possibility. That is: let me give an example of how a nuclear weapon could well have been used. According to French intelligence sources quoted in French papers during the Falklands crisis, the British fleet had nuclear weapons with it. This is almost certainly true. As Admiral LaRoque of the Center for Defense Information tells us, 70% of American warships have nuclear weapons on them. Virtually all types of American warships do, on occasion, carry nuclear weapons. But at any given time, about 70% have nuclear weapons on them. They never take them off for a given mission; they carry them with them. The British ships can be assumed to have had a variety of nuclear weapons, including nuclear anti-submarine weapons, mines and torpedos. There were 2 or 3 very modern German-built submarines the Argentines had which the British never located, despite their anti-submarine capability. If you do locate a submarine, the tendency first is to locate it within a very large region. Then you use special means to try to pin it down, if you have time to do so. General Belgrano, on the Argentine ship which was destroyed outside this very large area (200 miles, I think it was) which had been embargoed around the Falklands. It was destroyed because it was heading in. With its missiles, it might have gotten within a danger zone. If German-built submarines had been located within a general large area, within a danger area related either to the Queen Elizabeth or the aircraft carrier, I would say, from my experience of military planning, one should have expected a very high likelihood that the admiral in charge would have at least considered, and

probably would have used, nuclear anti-submarine mines rather than suffer the possible loss of the aircraft carrier. Of course, in saying that I am speaking from the assumption, based on some knowledge, that commanders are much closer to the use of these things, and have been in the past, than you may have realized. That would seem to them far more than enough reason to use it.

These same stories alleged that the commander had been delegated the power to use such weapons, if necessary, without referral to London, which was thousands of miles away and had bad communications. Again, my experience on the specific problem of delegation would tell me that that is almost certainly true.

So let's just take that as a hypothesis. The first use of a nuclear weapon since Nagasaki could have been a nuclear anti-submarine mine against an Argentine submarine, thus saving the Queen Elizabeth II, filled with British soldiers. No fallout, no civilian casualties, fully effective, and accepted by at least one liberal nuclear power, the British, and no doubt the U.S.--not only seen as highly effective, but as thoroughly necessary and legitimate. The world would have awakened from that demonstration, rubbed its eyes and said, "Wow, you can use a nuclear weapon militarily without blowing up the world, for a good cause. Nothing else would have done as well."

If they had known exactly where the submarine was, or pretty precisely, they would have had lots of means of getting it without using a nuclear warhead. But if they knew the location only generally, and if they didn't want to take a lot of time searching because it seemed to be moving toward attacking, they would in all likelihood use a nuclear warhead to clean it out, to destroy it. It would be under water, no civilian casualties, and would probably get the submarine. I say all this in response to the common questions you may have heard: Can you use a nuclear weapon? Can there be a limited nuclear war? The answer to my mind is unequivocally: yes, there can be...Of course we had one against Japan, but we were the only power who had nuclear weapons at that time. Can there be one in the current world? Yes, in particular against a country that doesn't have nuclear weapons.

And as new countries get nuclear weapons, they will all have neighbors, rivals, who don't yet have nuclear weapons and are candidates for the kinds of threats that we have made in the past. Now one of the articles there, the "Call to Mutiny" article, lists a numbers of cases in which we have threatened the use of nuclear weapons in the past--about a dozen times or so. We have, in other words, been much closer to the brink of using nuclear weapons than the American public knew at the time. This is a little-known fact. So this is one of the things in my head. I am aware that past presidents have, much more often than most Americans know, considered and even threatened the initiation of nuclear war in situations that were far from representing threats on the order of, say, the loss of Europe. They didn't involve Russians at all.

What I am saying is that other countries could make threats and carry those threats out in the future, under very similar circumstances. They don't have to be crazier than Harry Truman, or Eisenhower, or Kennedy, or Johnson, or Nixon, all of whom made such threats. The Soviets at first glance have not made as many serious threats, but for much of the nuclear era their adversary was enormously superior to them. That is why I say there is some reason to worry in the future, because we are not any longer superior in the same way. In that sense, the risks have gone up. I don't go on the assumption that weapons in the hands of Russians are thoroughly safe, or safer than they are in the hands of Americans--that is insufficient reassurance.

On the question of what these weapons would do, it is very hard to imagine much use that stays limited to naval warfare. Robert Tucker, for example, has actually written articles in Commentary proposing the readiness to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East. He points out that you have deserts there; you could use them with no problem without getting any civilians to speak of, just stirring up the sands. He obviously has images in mind of [ramals], desert warfare, where there were no civilians around during those battles. That would be possible too. But that chance that such wars would stay limited to that is

--not zero, but very small. You can assume that as you get in the vicinity of people, with these sizable weapons you are going to kill a great many people. If it gets two-sided at all with reprisals coming to play, which seems highly likely, than the slaughter is going to be enormous, but could still be regionally limited. And I could imagine this going on for some time. When I say, then, that this is my nightmare, it involves a kind of intentional readiness for genocidal warfare, massacre as a way of warfare. My first reaction is to think of it as a kind of evolutionary change of the species, a willingness consciously to massacre as a part of "civilized" existence. I do not like to think of living with this. I do not like to think of our country, or any other, preparing itself for warfare which means nothing but My Lai's on the scale of 1,000, where Hiroshimas equal warfare..."This is warfare; warfare happens this way." People consciously preparing for it....I would do anything to avert that, and I see us as heading into that.

Of course, that is not the end of it. It is in fact, for more or less ^{technical} technological reasons, as well as psychological reasons, highly likely that such an era, after first encouraging people to believe that it was safer than they expected, and almost tempting them to believe, to say: "Aha, we all need nuclear anti-submarine mines now; we all need anti-aircraft nuclear missiles; they are usable and they don't blow the world up."... So the proliferation would speed along. But the highly likely upshot is that the major inventories of nuclear weapons which we now have do explode. The fire does reach the arsenal, finally. And the Northern Hemisphere goes up (and increasingly possibly, the Southern Hemisphere.) I keep saying the Northern Hemisphere because global winds are such that most fallout will stay in the hemisphere where the bombs explode. And nearly all the targets now are in the Northern Hemisphere. But that is changing already. Already Australia has a number of its crucial military bases for the U.S. South Africa is getting into the act. Argentina, as I heard the other day, is about to acquire nuclear weapons. Within a decade, the Southern Hemisphere may have a considerable

number of targets. So then that goes. But I'm saying -- even that, as Teller points out, as I mentioned last week, even that doesn't mean that all life on earth is destroyed, necessarily, or even probably. I want to mention right now not just for black humor, bring to our awareness the fact that the proponents of the arms race put very great emphasis on the fact that not everybody is destroyed in a nuclear war, in fact that most people are not destroyed. They sound totally unreasonable when they say that when we read Sh^ell and when we read the others, but they may well be right, actually, about that. But even if you guess that they are right, that half the people, or even two-thirds, three-quarters of the people survive, only a billion die, it seems macabre and bizarre that they should put so much emphasis on it. The fact is, I think, that they have defined that as an intolerable moral policy. It is immoral to destroy all life on earth. That is their limit. They can't imagine a greater evil than that. But any other degree of massacre short of that could be optimal in some situation where the alternatives were sufficiently bad, and so it's not to be tabooed, it's not to be put out, you might need it. It might be the appropriate remedy, dangerous as it is, for some horrible situation.

Anyway, let me put that aside. I'm saying that not only is it enough to worry about killing a billion people, it's also enough to worry about killing hundreds of thousands or millions of people, which is a thousand times less, that's a thousandth of a billion. Big difference. But I'm saying that the use of

neutron warheads which we are preparing, the use of many other nuclear warheads and even non-nuclear weapons is preparing us for wars that may well happen, go on for a while, for quite a while, which aren't what we feared in terms of destroying all the cities in the northern hemisphere, but in fact are repeatedly lethal on the order of World War I and World War II, except mostly in the Third World. That to me, too, is enough to take enormous efforts to try to understand and change.

Another preview of something we'll deal more substantively with later: How could -- I'm saying that I see these people doing this preparing for it deliberately. That takes a lot of understanding, you know, to believe it. It just is basically incredible. Since all of these wars that I'm talking about, even if they do in fact remain limited, have the clear risk of blowing up everybody, in fact that's always a possibility, with a much higher probability of blowing up a billion people, it seems as I say incredible to imagine that that could be done deliberately, that people could be doing that. I'm saying, that, moreover, the slaughter is clearly on both sides. I'm talking about a process that I think I see with a lot of evidence and background that involves extraordinary risk taking on the one hand, and extraordinary murderousness at the same time on the other hand. And I'm saying that in both cases the risks and the homicidal aspects are in fact being done by a lot of humans, being prepared, planned, designed, a lot of humans who pretty well foresee what the stakes are, and are taking these gambles or these potentially murderous plots, even though

they're in the form of contingency plans, but plans that might be implemented -- more or less deliberately, consciously and deliberately. It's not all being done by computers, as in the war game movie, without our knowing what's going on. ^PIn a way, if that seems paradoxical, it's paradoxical the way the information in the Pentagon Papers raised problems, raised questions. The reigning theory of the Vietnam escalation before the Pentagon Papers came out was very like the current usual understanding of the arms race by critics of the arms race. That it's somehow going on beneath the level of human awareness, or behind our backs, of the President and of everybody else. Presumably there are people who see part of the problem bureaucratically who are pushing it along, but it has an inchoate, incoherent aspect, a momentum to it that does not reflect any human will. No one foresaw where it's going, no one desired this. ^PIt's obvious no one wants a nuclear war, and I'm going to say no one, I believe, does want a big nuclear war. But it's also believed beyond that that no one really wants the arms race to continue. It just happens. Of course, given scientists that want a particular design of theirs to go forward, given manufacturers who want a given plant, so that little contributory vectors here add up to this onrushing torrent on both sides. And that's the view pretty much, as I say, of most critics of the arms race that I work with, people like E. P. Thompson or Lord Zucherman or Herb York, or most people in the arms control business, like Paul Warmke and others. They particularly point at the narrow perspective of the weapons

laboratories, like Draper Laboratory, and see it's these narrow parochial interests that push the thing on. As I say, it's like the President had subscribed, I suggested, to a Missile of the Month Club, a long time ago, and now his secretary just pays the bills and these missiles keep arriving and they go on the shelf. Nobody really wanted them, and they're not usable, they're not used. And occasionally you get a bonus along with it, like MERV or something that comes along. But it's not that anybody really wants these things or needs them. Well, that was the impression of the Vietnam War, that the President had been misled to believe at each point by bureaucrats that the next step would be all that was necessary. So that when he had 16,000 troops in he was led to believe that the next 20,000 troops would win the war. And so he did that. And then he was convinced that that didn't work, but the next 50,000 troops would do it, and so forth. This is a model that he went blindly into a quagmire without knowing at all where he was going, that no President had ever imagined that in order to win the war he might have to do more than what we were even doing, 500,000 troops. What the Pentagon Papers showed was that that answer could not be true, that the President had always been told that what he was doing would not win the war, and that more would be called for. And yet he went ahead, having been told that, and with no reason really to believe otherwise. The Pentagon Papers did not answer why the President did this, but it did answer the question that the responsibility somehow, the notion that the responsibility somehow lay beneath the level of the President, and the

President had been inattentive and had not been choosing these levels. It made it very clear that the President had every reason to believe that with the course he was taking we were going into a very big war eventually, though he was telling the public the opposite. It made it unmistakably clear that the President had consciously lied to the public throughout this, presumably for good intentions, although what the intentions were just didn't emerge. As a matter of fact, one reason that I put out 7,000 pages of the Pentagon Papers without omitting a single paragraph -- (and, by the way, I copied these tonight at Noman Copy, which is one of the places I copied the Pentagon Papers) I wondered whether they would look askance at me when I came in. "Call the FBI." A lot of secrets in those papers, actually. One reason I did copy every page without omitting anything was that I knew that, I felt that if I left even a page out, left it blank, people would believe that that ^{was} the page that had the good reason for dropping 7-1/2 million tons of bombs on Vietnam. This is what they were really up to. And the length of this thing, the scope of it was with all this paper, you read from beginning to end, or you sample it, which is, of course, what people did, and you just begin gradually, it takes quite a while, a rather large sample, to really begin to get the feeling: no where in here is there a reason, a justification for thirty years of war, for 7-1/2 million tons of bombs, for 50,000 American casualties, for 2 million Vietnamese dead. Nothing like it. In other words, no where anything that conveys that a sense of proportionality of any kind was working on that

process. And of course you get a good feeling that with all this, this many plans, this many estimates, if you don't find a good enough reason here, there may not be one. That doesn't tell you how this happened. It doesn't tell you what the President was up to. But it does tell you: Don't assume the President is (what shall we say?) on our side. Don't assume the President really is making the decisions I would make if I were in his spot and I had his information^{*}, as he keeps telling us. That was the basic thing for keeping us quiet. Because if this is his information, people read this and said, "I can't believe that I would have done or could have made these decision." At any rate, he shouldn't have done it. Now, they might be wrong. If they'd been in his spot and they'd had that information and the same pressures on him that he had and everything, I'm now prepared to say the way to bet would be they might have done much the same. He's not, in fact, a different breed from them. But there is this: The public does have a belief that the President somehow should have a sense, in the sense of the just war theory, a sense of proportionality between means and ends, between the destruction inflicted and the interests at stake. And also a sense of discrimination in the types of targets that are acceptable. As I'm saying, they perhaps should not bet that they themselves would act differently from the President if they were literally in his spot, but they believe that a President, that they ought to, and they believe that a President should in fact not deliberately massacre. Let me define massacre slightly technically, as in this Kelman paper. The deliberate organized

killing or slaughter of people who offer no immediate threat, who are not justifying violence done on themselves by their own preparations, their own threats of imminent violence themselves. Basically it means killing unarmed women and children, or even unarmed men for that matter, especially old men, sick men, civilians. When Christian theorizing with Augustine around the time of Constantine began to compromise with the previous pacifism of Christianity with the requirements of serving the empire, and accepted the notion that violence could be acceptable and Christian under some circumstances, the theorizing laid down at the same time principles of, constraints on this, limits on acceptable violence even done under orders and by legitimate authority. And this came to be known as just war criteria. Basically, it's the criterion of when you can use violence, primarily self defense, both personal or in an organized way. But also limits on what you can do even in war time. The crucial limit, in war time, is the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. And that can be interpreted variously. But the Catholics and later Protestants who picked this up, interpreted combatants fairly narrowly to mean armed men usually, and even men at the point of combat, some question even as to whether soldiers far back in the logistics task, and so forth, support counted, could be killed. But, on the whole, armed combatants, disciplined combatants. Some question arose in the 20th century about including war workers, workers in munitions factories as combatants essentially, and there was some acceptance of that, but not by Catholics on

the whole, and not legally, but by military people. Basically then it's combatant, that's military versus civilian. And there was an absolute prescription in this theorizing which was further developed by Aquinas and then by other Catholics, and then became picked up by the Protestants in the Reformation, and became the core of international law in warfare, the law of conduct during warfare in the 17th century and later. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants and an absolute prescription of deliberate killing of non-combatants. The grey area here was the allowance for the possibility, the acceptability of killing randomly and inadvertently some civilians, some non-combatants in the course of attacking an important and necessary military target. But here the element of proportionality came in. In other words, you had to look at how many non-combatants were you killing in theory. Very specifically, you weren't allowed to go after a city, to destroy a city in order to get some military people who were in it. That would be nonproportionate. And you couldn't deliberately target a city at all. It was immoral and illegal under international law. And this, by the way, has been codified in very many, not only the Hague conventions of the last century, but in all the repetitions of those after the Second World War and up until quite recently Geneva regulations of very recently still maintain this strong distinction and the proscription.

Now I described to you last week nuclear war plans by the United States that involved initiating the use of nuclear operations against every city in Russia and China, identified

essentially as cities with no pretense that you were targeting a location within that city or even in the suburbs of the city. If we're talking about 20 megaton warheads, as is the case in many of these things, you're talking not about blockbusters or city busters, but region-busters that destroy by fire enormous regions of territory and even larger regions with fallout. Everything in those areas, that is indiscriminately destroyed. This cuts against an interpretation of international law that is a little clearer than most Americans have ever heard. Here's a resolution of 24 November, 1961, which was the height of the Berlin Crisis. Any state using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which were seen then as indiscriminate and disproportionate weapons by their nature, in fact, genocidal weapons by virtue of -- genocide, by the way, is interpreted as the deliberate destruction of all or part of an ethnic, religious or national group per se. And obviously taking out, let's say, one or more cities of the Soviet Union where the people are being killed for no other reason than that they are Russians living in cities, Soviet citizens living in cities, is taking out a good part of that country.

Okay. "Any state using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity, and is committing a crime against mankind and civilization." That was accepted by 55 votes in favor, 20 against, 26 abstentions. Almost all NATO countries voted against that resolution except Norway, Denmark and Iceland, which abstained. That says -- the question of using

has a slight ambiguity because some international lawyers claim that reprisal, that any such statement allows for reprisal as retaliation, possibly for second strike. Others denied that. That statement, though, unquestionably rules out first use. To make that a little sharper, a more recent declaration in 1980 talks about first use; "...any doctrine allowing the first -- (this is 1981, 9 December, 1981) -- any doctrine allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world toward a catastrophe incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the UN. States and statesmen that resort first to nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity." That's crime against humanity in the sense of the Nuremberg principles, of which genocide is one example of crime against humanity. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Eighty-two in favor, 19 opposing, including the U.S. and most NATO nations opposing. How many people here knew of either of these resolutions, had heard of them? One, two? These resolutions do not make international law, UN resolutions. They represent by the states their official interpretation, their judgement as to the burden of existing international law. This is their understanding of what is now illegal under the UN charter and under existing international law. The U.S. then is saying, "we don't interpret international law that way." That is, potentially, rather self serving, because U.S. and the NATO countries are countries that have maintained the right to threaten and to use nuclear weapons

first, and their plans have been based on that throughout. Virtually every country not in that category says we read international law to make what you're doing criminal. And in fact if you look at the law ... [end of side A, tape 1]

Where we are, I assert, in a world where American leaders for a long time since early in the Second World War have regarded massacre from the air, essentially, as an available and necessary instrument of U.S. policy. Clearly, by the way, other countries that have nuclear weapons can have the same attitudes by now, but we were, of course, the first. I will be saying that that attitude was not born with nuclear weapons. It does not merely represent what nuclear weapons are for, it's not merely an adaptation. The roots are deeper than that. Nuclear weapons were designed and developed in order to implement a policy of massacre which had been accepted by our leaders and by the British leaders some years earlier. I'm paraphrasing a lot of information which I don't expect to be at all familiar to you at this point, or many of you. It's alluded to in some of that material. Specifically, one way to put it would be to say that British and American leaders adopted Hitlerian tactics used against Rotterdam and Warsaw and London in the Battle of the Blitz, of deliberate aerial bombardment of civilian areas as the deliberate (though secret from their own public) target. And while denying this to their own public, ^{they} deliberately set out to contribute to the war and to take offensive tactics designed to kill as many civilians as possible in the enemy territory, of all ages, of all types. Tactics were developed to this purpose.

How many people find what I'm saying a very familiar proposition? How many don't? Do not? How many do not, actually? Okay. Well, in other words, I think this is so important, in a way, that I'm not going to leave it in this course just at this level of assertion. This is what I'm talking about, is what I'm saying, what I'm going to be talking about. In fact, we find that, in short, the barrier that I've described between combatants and non-combatants was consciously, secretly breached at the highest civilian levels in Britain and America. Following Hitler's practice, to be sure, but picking up a doctrine that predated Hitler on the Allied side, a proposal which had been prepared by Americans and by British civilians and military long before Hitler even came to power, but then in the pressure of World War II became U.S. and British policy, was exemplified in the terror bombing of Japanese cities six months before Hiroshima, led to casualties far greater in the civilian population than occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bomb then was a weapon of indiscriminate killing to fulfill a policy of indiscriminate killing, had been a practice for some time.

One measure of hope that I have in the overall situation is that no leader has ever seen fit, no British or American leader, either retrospectively or currently, to explain to the American public exactly what our targeting policy really was, and to sort of bring them in on it and get their full compliance and agreement. They've all assumed that the moral strictures against that would give them political problems of some kind,

and I think that's true, and that's a basis for hope. If the plans are what they say they are, then they couldn't exist, I would hope, if they were less secret. And if they can be made less secret, it may be possible to change that. That's one of the things I'm working on. [¶] But to go back to the situation, then, I'm saying that atom bombs were fitted in to pre-existing types of Air Force planning, and then H bombs were fitted in to the same kinds of plans with an increase in explosive power of about 1,000. And that's where we are now. I said earlier that I saw -- I paraphrase what I said earlier -- I see statesmen, and led by American statesmen, and perhaps to be joined soon by lots of others, who threaten nuclear weapons secretly, often secretly from their own public, but not from the target, the adversary, as if they were threatening high explosive of tank attacks of the past. But they're threatening H bombs, and often against adversaries who have H bombs. If this is going on, it represents a kind of failure of inhibitions against mass violence of two distinct sorts: inhibitions of prudence of survival, inhibitions against what would seem to be suicidal behavior or suicidally ~~wreckless~~ behavior, because I should make it clear what they're making is threats, contingency plans, preparation. I do not perceive them as naming a day on which a nuclear war is to be carried out, at this point. That would seem sheerly suicidal, sheerly. But they are taking risks of mass murder and risks of mass suicide. Very high risks for what seem to the ordinary eyes of the citizen not in a position of power to be extraordinarily disproportionately small stakes.

And if, as I say, they're doing this consciously, that's what makes the problem interesting, in a way, then somehow what we think of as species safeguards against mass slaughter of one's own species, that is moral safeguards seem to have failed. Safeguards against doing harm to others. And simultaneously safeguards against doing harm to oneself, one's family, one's future, one's own country. Neither seems to be inhibiting this process adequately. Nor are democratic constraints inhibiting. Despite the fact that the public is believed to fear such things and to oppose it, they are successfully being neutralized in some way, which we can analyze. ¶ Actually, a rather unlikely person, critic, Jan Wenner, who was then very young, head of Rolling Stone, once wrote an editorial in Rolling Stone that caught my attention and just started it. He said that Vietnam war, and we were well in the middle of it at that point, the Vietnam war could be seen as a failure of our moral systems, a moral system. Not a phrase one usually sees, but I found it rather arresting because I thought that was true, something had gone wrong, as I saw this bombing go on and on and on. And as I said to those of you who were here last time, and I'll mention it, one of the large bodies of data that both perplex me but seem to me to hold a potential answer to something that's going on here, was my awareness that the bombing was being continued year after year after year by people who did not believe that it was justified. In other words, it was data like that what you'll find in the Milgrim experiment where one finds that people will shock or torture other people on command even if

they, the people doing the shocking, feel extremely upset and disturbed by what they're doing. People ask questions about this experiment, did the subjects really believe that the other guy was being shocked? Did they believe that the experimenter would let him be harmed, something like that. Maybe they knew it was all a game. That ignores a major aspect of the data, which is that a large number of the subjects showed tremendous stress during the experiment, they sweated, they were anguished, they cried, they said they would stop, they said this could not go on, it was wrong, they said they would not do it. But when told to continue, they continued, crying, sweating, under stress. Creating so much stress, by the way, that Milgrim was subject to great professional criticism later for causing such stress in experimental subjects. There's no way to take that data and say these people did not think that they were really giving the shocks, but they did give them. Now, many people insulate themselves against the meaning of that, they just can't believe it's significant. When I read it, of course, I thought I am reading now something that makes sense out of my body of experience, which is that I was surrounded in the Pentagon by people who believed that the war was awful, should stop, evil, and day by day they parked their car at the Pentagon parking lot and went up and carried on the war. I tried to understand them, see, but I couldn't understand. Milgrim didn't entirely explain it, but he does strongly imply this: What I had seen in the Pentagon was very widespread human behavior. The answer no longer seemed to me to lie in the area of the fact that the

people in the Pentagon were a very peculiar bunch of people, but that I was seeing something, whatever the reason was for it, I was seeing something that somehow should have been expected. This is the way people do act in this situation, for whatever reason it is. Milgram also shows something else that Kelman -- well, that the German experience doesn't. Americans can do this, and they can do it to people who are not perceived as racially inferior. For example, another point I think I made last time, many Americans think that the atom bomb could have been used only against the Japanese. Well, that limits the number of targets to some degree. But if you look at the planning on the atom bomb, I think you have to conclude what Roosevelt always said, and what Stimson (?) said, it was intended to be used against Germans if it had been used in time. And Germans, of course, are our second largest ethnic body in this country, fully perceived like Americans, in effect. I have no doubt at all that it would have been used against Germans. That's what Oppenheimer said, that's what everybody said. But we didn't experience that, so we don't quite see that. I know, of course, how close we've come to using it against Russians and others who, again, we don't see as an inferior race. Milgram makes that unmistakably clear. The people being tortured are not seen even as a lower status. They are just people designated as people to be tortured by their fellow citizens on command. It suggests that Americans in some situations, and now let me state what seems to be the major findings so far of the data we'll look at. The conditions of authority, conditions

that they are ordered to do so by an authority that they recognize as legitimate authority. The implications of the Milgram data are that Americans will do anything to anybody, it doesn't even have to be a dehumanized enemy, at least in any prior sense. Heavy charge to make. It is not part of our normal awareness. That's not -- I suppose, for anybody at this table, and I want to tell you, not for me, a prior assumption is that anything that's even slightly plausible, and I guess I have to keep telling you this, you don't know me, you come here to the course so you have a receptive attitude, but I just have to say: I am not a person who came into life, came into the Army, came into anything like this with the assumption that Americans were people who did this kind of thing that I'm talking about. It's extremely painful awareness that I'm suggesting at this point, and I'm not saying at this point you have to believe it, just be open to the possibility. Because there will be data in the course to look at that will, I think, make that pretty hard to escape. Even Americans, then, and even against anybody. And of course the implication I would draw from that is, if Americans will do it, others will do it; as other people get the bomb, they will do it. And they aren't too limited. Why, then, is my sense so much more urgent in some ways than many of my colleagues and friends who don't, as I see it, share the same data base. Because I am burdened with the thought, and it seems to me that I got it from experience and from data, not from personality, as far as I can make out. Not a welcome thought to me. I see a far greater number of victims as potential victims

of massacre in the world due to the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and a greater number of perpetrators of massacre than I used to imagine. Not just Kadafi, not just Idi Amin, not just the Hitler. But people of the sort we tend to elect, and we have to assume of the sort we will continue to elect. So although I do see hope, I wouldn't put it much in electing an entirely different sort of person from the kind we've had before. It must be somewhere else, there must be some other kind of basis for hope, I would have to say, and I think there is another basis.

I could sum this up by a statement that in a way gives one of the themes of what I want to address, the problems here. It's a diary item by David Lilienthal of the TVA who was appointed head of the Atomic Energy Commission between 1945 and '50. And on December 21st, 1947, he wrote this in his diary: "Is not the worst fact about modern scientific weapons, notably the atomic bomb, the effect they have upon moral concepts, those patiently built fragile steps out of the jungle from which man has emerged. For centuries men have fought wars, but these were fought within certain rather well defined ethical line fences. I don't mean only those international rules of warfare embodied into some law, international law. I mean the fact that warfare was something like a game, a competition, and the presence of ethical limitations and standards was always recognized. An unarmed man was not to be shot. A man who put on the uniform of the enemy had stepped over the line and could be simply dealt with, etc. Then the Italians bombed villages of the Ethiopians

and expressed pleasure over the sight. Everyone recoiled with horror. The Germans obliterated an area of Rotterdam. This was a crime, for it wiped out the notion of an individual adversary. The B2s were directed against anyone who happened to be there, not against a military target, that is an individual adversary, not against an individual adversary. Then we bombed Tokyo. Not just military targets, but set out to wipe out the place indiscriminately. The atomic bomb is the last word in this direction. All ethical limitations of warfare are gone. Not because the means of destruction are more cruel or painful or otherwise hideous in their effect upon combatants, but because there are no individual combatants. The fences are gone. And it was we, the civilized, who have pushed standardless conduct to its ultimate. Most of the talk about the bomb relates to the danger to the world in a physical sense. But isn't the real danger to civilization to be found in the recognition that warfare is no longer a conflict within limits imposed by morality, but without limit, without moral containment." That's in Lilienthal's diaries. The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-50, page 271.

A last five minutes of commentary on that, that item. First, as I've just said, strictly speaking these moral limits are still in the minds of most people. They do recoil still from a Moral Law. They accept Hiroshima on the grounds that there was a virtually transcendent cause to be -- well, a comparable, literally proportional cause to be achieved; namely, that we were saving a million American lives. So that particular

example, which raises questions, is accepted on the grounds that it was killing some people but to save a much larger number of people altogether, even Japanese lives. Generally, though, they do recoil from the notion of deliberate destruction. The leaders, on the one hand, have not been democratically prevented from planning the destruction of cities by that democratic feeling, either during the Second World War or since, and Lilienthal knew that. So Lilienthal is talking about leaders' behavior, and a failure of democratic controls. But that raises the question of what's happened to the leaders? Why did they step across this line? He's made one thing clear, I think, and this he recognizes very well. It didn't happen at the time of Hiroshima, it happened earlier, it happened in a spirit of revenge, of retaliation, in part, of imitation, but imitation of who? Imitation of Hitler, and the Japanese. Interesting moral standard. By the way, do you know what V2 stands for, what the V stands for? It's the German word for revenge, it's revenge weapon, vengeance weapon. It was the weapon for the bombing of Berlin and others, it was an indiscriminate target weapon. Virgeltungsfaffen (sp?), or something like that. I don't speak German. And that it went through Tokyo, and so forth, where more people were killed than were killed in Hiroshima. So he knows that. That, of course, partly explains why Truman and later people were able to plan this way, because their revered predecessors had already set that precedent, the line had been crossed. And of course that's been true ever since. But one further thought. He says the atomic bomb is the last word in

this direction. Not true. The atomic bomb at Hiroshima killed perhaps a hundred thousand people. We killed at least that many in Tokyo without using an atomic bomb six months earlier. And in other places as well. The atomic bombs did not in fact change the scale of destruction to be expected in warfare. I find this an explanation of how people did bring themselves to make the plans of the early 50's which targeted Russian cities. They expected a brief thunderclap of a war which, if it occurred, would kill as many people -- less than World War II. You took a risk of doing that in order to avoid a World War II. I think that's the moral calculation they made. They had already reached the assumption that it's all right to kill civilians to prevent a war. That had been crossed by FDR, by Churchill, by Hitler, by others, though the public didn't know it. So they were still in a scale of casualties of millions that were less, possibly -- we were calculating less casualties in war with Russia in the early 50's than had occurred in World War II. Two years, or I should say three years after he wrote this, this was December '47, in January '50, just three years later, Truman embarked on a crash program for the H bomb. We didn't have H bombs until about 1955 or '56, operational H bombs. Ten years after Hiroshima. H bombs use atomic bombs for their triggers. I don't know if I raised this last time. How many people at this table did not know that, what I just said? Is there not anybody? Just one person? Well, maybe some of you have read what I've -- I can say that until the Physicians for Social Responsibility began to educate people quite a bit about

H bombs, a few years ago almost nobody in an audience could honestly say they knew that. An H bomb takes the bombs that Lilienthal is talking about, it requires such a bomb as its detonator. These same bombs were fitted into the same targeting schemes, and expected casualties went from five and ten million, to 500 million. Explosive power goes up by a thousand, but the deaths go up by about a hundred for various reasons. And that's where we are.

Last point. What Milgram suggests, what Kelman suggests, is that there is a phenomenon going on of literally limitless behavior. Limitless obedience. And one guesses from that that the reason that people do not kill more than they did in the past is because they either did not have the physical capability to do it or they weren't ordered to do it. That's the dread extrapolation of this data we have here from Mei Ly. I think we have here an example of it. The people who five years after Lilienthal, ten years after, were planning the deaths of 500 million, were not a hundred times more bloodthirsty than the warmen of Lilienthal's day. Lilienthal had just noticed that we would kill as many people as we could, that that was the nature of our planning. And as the capability expanded, the requirements of deterence didn't expand, the planning for killing just expanded. So I think a problem we have to address is, what are the solvents, what dissolves what we think of as ordinary human restraints against fantastically wreckless behavior and fantastically murderous behavior? What is it in human society or human experience that releases safety catches

that we imagine are protecting us, and which I suggest are not in fact protecting us at this moment. And one aspect of that almost surely, I think, will come out in this course -- and I hope we learn a lot more about it -- one aspect of that is the nature of our human, widely shared human response to authority in organizations, that the tendency to obey without limit and without question, not only by Germans, but by Americans and by most people in the world, authoritative directions to inflict harm on other people is far greater as a tendency than we as humans tend to understand from our everyday observations and is the major threat to human survival. I'll be very specific about it as a hypothesis. Human survival is threatened by nothing so much in the world today as the possibility of humanly contrived and carried out catastrophes performed at the direction of legitimate authorities, performed in good conscience by obedient, good citizens, reflecting obedience that to a degree they themselves could not probably predict before the event is without limit.

QUESTION: There's part of me that just wants to scream for you to be quiet, because somehow, having this thing pounded -- the lack of moral restraint. I want to say no, One of the things that made the Milgram experiment very believable to me as I saw the film, and did get me trying to picture, is the design of it ... false, because they also showed clearly that people told them to go to hell. People just told them to get out and leave me alone. So, in fact, there are people that set

restraints. I don't know the raw data, not enough.

The other thing is, all the way through -- I think you did get to it much more right at the end, kind of leaving the question hanging about what would motivate the leaders to go beyond the moral restraint of earlier times, or whatever. That is, in some sense we may be all capable, or society may be capable of designing this, but what -- there's part of me that still longs to say, what's the cause for that? Why would they go ... I thought at the end you said something that -- there's one key, I don't assume there's just one key, but it relates enough to some of the things I've heard of in talking with kids and families. That is, there was a girl in a family that we interviewed that, this 14-year-old girl whose father had actually grown up and been in Italy during the bombing of World War II, Italian family. She said, in the course of the interview, almost in an offhand way, she said, "World War II must have been horrible. To think of that, to think of people shooting another person that you could see, having to dodge those bombs. It would be better if we all go together. And I just hear something so powerful in this, It's somehow the massive and total avoidance of grief, that is, in some way these incredible risks are taken because they want to avoid another World War II. They think they're going to avoid -- what they really hope is that we'll never have to experience something like that again where 20 million people are killed. I don't know, the only way I can think about ... is lack of dealing with grief and the experience of grief and the guilt and whatever

else is involved, and I always try to picture what's going to happen between -- what I don't know is what happened between Milgram and the people after it was all done, and who wanted to go beat him up. I don't know how they dealt with that experience.

DE: It's in the book.

QUESTION: Okay, good. But the bent (?) is, I think there's some lack and some wish and this whole nuclear era has kind of provided I think some fantasy that we'll never have to go through this again. It won't happen, or we'll all go together. Even when you said about Eisenhower, that he kind of said, Look budgetarily we can't afford this. We're not going to have combat troops. We're imagining this general who had feelings about all the people who died under his command, and just never again was going to do that. He'd rather do this crazy scheme in the hope that he'd never have to feel that grief again.

So I put that out as one way of dealing with it. There's something that takes people past the moral restraint, in fact is, at some level, has a positive connotation to it. That they really couldn't deal with the grief of what happened. I don't know how many million Americans died -- that World War II was a holocaust.

DE: That doesn't quite explain the Milgram trial, does it?

QUESTION: Well, I guess I -- it doesn't speak to why the actual people who would carry out the violence. And I don't think I'm disputing the material, but it does say to me something -- it still doesn't say to me why the leaders get in that position. I offer that as something about the leaders. And also, there's a mass of followers who -- and people in this country -- who don't protest, who don't speak up, and what immobilizes them. The kids I talked with know they're not going to carry out these instructions. I'm sure some of the boys are worried. But what immobilizes the mass of people -- that is, a lot of people who care who aren't active. And I think there is some shared sense that we won't have to experience grief, mothers^{os} won't have to send their sons off individually, or their daughters. There's this whole fantasy, all right, ^owe won't ever have an experience like that again.

DE: Actually, I think there's a lot in what you're saying. You know, in 1961 there was -- one of the last efforts of the beat generation came out, a thing called The Journal for the Protection of All Beings. It's a big journal, put out a new edition of it recently in San Francisco, with Alan Ginsberg and ^{Garry}~~Harry~~ (?) Snider and Gregory Corso (?) and a lot of other people. And there's a very interesting interview by Alan Ginsberg at that point and somebody else, and Gregory Corso, I guess, saying -- what I can remember is something like this: People think that it's all going to be over in an instant. But supposing it isn't. Supposing it's sort of an eternal kind of burning

feeling, or something like that. It's Buddhist perception of eternity in an instant, something like that. What if they could imagine, you know, that it wasn't going to be over so fast. There really is -- one of the -- I guess PSR people, the Physicians for Social Responsibility, do bring this out to a certain extent. Not everybody's going to be at ground zero, as a matter of fact. And the people around the edges, depending, you know, are going to be -- there may be many more people who are affected by this than who go in the instant. I think the idea of everybody going together does make the idea of nuclear war marginally somewhat more acceptable, more bearable. We all go at once, we all go together. We leave no survivors, we are not survivors. If worse comes to worst, everybody dies, and it's not the worst way to die. It's better than dying of cancer, except it is dying of cancer, that's the trouble.

QUESTION: Also, when I hear you talk about it, one of the first things that I think of is breaking down the difference between combatants and non-combatants. I never could understand why there was, let's say, such a emphasis on the difference between civilians and military anyway, because I really don't see that, say, my boyfriend, who's sent into war and he's given this gun, that his death is so much more all right than mine. So in some ways the idea of, well, just getting rid of all that could make more sense to me than having these artificial rules when how can deaths have affects.

DE: Well, that's the way a lot of soldiers have come to think. You know, people who say that they're happy -- by the way, a lot of our fathers that I run into who say, "I was on my way to Japan from Europe when the bomb was dropped and I was unmistakably happy, and I have no qualms about it right now. It was their lives or mine, and better those civilians than mine. Why mine. And so forth. That's a very common, American perception. Millions of Americans felt themselves in that position at that time. They weren't all going to go, but they were worried about it.

I think one has to understand the strategic bombing material which I'll come to, I think, in the time after this. Let's all go to that Milgram stuff next, if we can. And then after that I want to talk about the strategic bombing material. As a matter of fact, I just came across -- I thought I brought the strategic bombing book. Let me give you a reference -- I thought I had the book with me to show you -- History of Strategic Bombing. It's really worth reading. It's not required, exactly, but I recommend it very strongly. By Kennett. It just came out. I brought it with me just to see how it shaped up. And actually it's a very good account. It's about as good as any I've seen. I have some other references I'll get to. Anyway, I think it's important to understand that, because it's crucial to the very specific threat we're facing now. I think you can't understand our strategic bombing policies without understanding the roots in our nuclear policies, without understanding the roots in the strategic

★
★
bombing policies. And as you see that history, you can see how it emerged, rather secretly, as a military and high civilian thing. But part of it is -- in fact, in the broadest sense I'm suggesting obedient behavior, and specifically obedience within bureaucracies, is a tremendous threat in the world today. Unquestioning obedience of what may be illegitimate authority.

QUESTION: How do you understand that the President kept up the bombing?

DE: Ah, that's a very good -- let me come back to that. First let me just finish this. That's a very good question. Perfect question.

★
★
So, I'm summing up what I've been saying in these first two lectures in this way. I am pointing toward an examination in this group, I hope, in which I hope we'll come up with new ideas. And I expect that, actually, as to understanding the phenomena of obedience, how it can be changed, how we can do something about it, possibly. But really, the particular phenomenon that poses a risk to survival is more specific than that, and that is practices that revolve around a very specific bureaucracy, mainly Air Force. Air Force thinking about conducting wars by bombing civilians with nuclear weapons, to be very specific. Which grew out of bombing civilians with non-nuclear weapons. That is a very specific threat with a history. The history goes back to before the First World War, and is very important from just before the Second World War. But the point

I was going to make now in response to Ariella's point is this: What it took, I think, to make some military men and high civilians cross the border of this centuries-old distinction between combatant and non-combatant was the slaughter of 13 million uniformed combatants in World War I. The effect of limiting the targets to military men made war seem acceptable and useable as an instrument of policy, because it limited the number of people who might be killed in the warfare, even less than your capabilities might allow. You weren't allowed to turn your cannon and your machine guns on people other than the uniformed people who were threatening you. So it set a limit to who could be killed. And of course the limit was seen in particular to people who are relatively voluntary and a particular part of the population, and so forth. That didn't look like a very meaningful limit to especially soldiers. After World War I, when the industrial capabilities of modern technical industrial societies to kill soldiers and the ability of industrial societies to turn out armies of soldiers proved to be almost unlimited. The soldiers now were an enormous part of the population of that age group, at least. So you were killing an enormous part of the generation, of that generation. And so I think psychologically, one can see very clearly in memoirs of people who developed strategic bombing doctrine, and I won't give the whole lecture now, I'll just say that they looked down on the trench warfares where, on the first day of the battle of the Somme (?), 60,000 British soldiers died. And in a matter of months, half a million British, half a million Germans had died

and had moved the battle line six miles. And they looked down at that and they said, There has to be a better way to fight wars. Now, another solution would be, There's got to be a better way than war. But that wasn't their professional reaction, so then it has to be, a better way to fight. And what they thought was, better to kill a few civilians and get it over with fast than to allow this indecisive slaughter of combatants. And so they didn't push that on the civilians, but in their own mind they thought, they won't appreciate this, but it's now time that they took their lumps, in effect. And sometimes this was said, in so many words. It's time for the civilians to do their part of the dying. And if by doing that you get the war over with quickly, surely it's justifiable. So they felt they had crossed this little technical boundary, but they still felt they were believers in limited warfare because they were going to get it over with faster than in World War I. And, of course, what we're faced with is that the slaughter can be enormously ____.

QUESTION: Wasn't it sort of understood ever since the beginning of the development of nuclear weapons that though they hadn't reached their most effective ____ that people anticipated they would be enormously destructive? Did they think, "Oh, this is really great." I thought all along they knew that this could be much more destructive and then were moving towards that.

DE: People meaning who?

QUESTION: Meaning the scientists who could communicate that --

DE: Scientists knew that, yes. I don't know whether the public -- the public sort of thought from the beginning that it was the absolute weapon. The first book written about the atom bomb, edited by Bernard Brody, was called The Absolute Weapon, and it does describe it in terms which, in retrospect, are not appropriate to atomic weapons. By 1949, before the H bomb, they had discovered -- what I described a little bit -- in their war gaming they discovered that these bombs in numbers of hundreds only didn't actually stop the Russian armies from being able to take over Europe. You could hit all the cities, but that didn't keep the Russians from moving ahead and taking -- they would have Europe. And we'd have destroyed Russia, but they'd have Europe in that time. You couldn't stop the Russian armies with a few hundred atomic bombs, which was all we had. And so their answer to that was to decide to -- as during the war, whenever they -- they suddenly had discovered what -- by the way, the Russians had calculated earlier, they made the same calculations, and realized that their armies were a deterrent to an attack, and that the atom bomb wasn't an absolute weapon. It made, to quote the way this is described in the Pentagon, "Atom bombs make holes in cities." But take Hiroshima, which is a moderate-size city. It only killed half the people in Hiroshima. Half the people were left in Hiroshima. The same bomb in Tokyo would have destroyed the same number of people, roughly, and left nearly everybody in Tokyo.

QUESTION: So in terms of strategic planning, wasn't it known -- the potential was there that it would become much bigger.

DE: Well, there was a limit to how big the atom bombs could be. What happened with the H bomb was that they jumped by a factor of a thousand from one year to the next. The plans didn't change. So with the H bomb you had something like an absolute weapon. But that was ten years later. And people didn't fully foresee the H bomb. So what it really amounted to was, in 1945 they overestimated what they had, actually. And that's what, in part, led Truman to think that he had this winning weapon that we couldn't afford to share, really. That's why our efforts to share were shams. We didn't plan to share if we had the absolute weapon. But by '49 they could see two things: They could see you needed bigger weapons if you're going to use them, and you could get them. About that time, actually Oppenheimer, at about the time he was going to -- they still didn't know if the H bomb was feasible, by the way, in '50. They thought it might or might not be. By late '51 they knew it was feasible. And in '52 Oppenheimer wrote this anguished piece in Foreign Affairs which I have with me saying, "The public is being hampered by secrecy here. What they must know and what they're not being told is that the current weapons are only the beginning. And soon we will have weapons that are 20 times bigger, 50 times bigger, 100 times bigger, and a 1,000 times bigger." He was describing the weapon that had just been tested

in November, 195¹~~2~~, but was secret, that had 15 megatons, that is 1,000 times the Hiroshima weapon. Which is 13 kiloton. But that wasn't publicly known. And he was trying to tell them [end of side B, Tape 1]

[tape 2, side A - begins in the middle of a question] ... and you can't just -- and it isn't -- I'm not satisfied that the Milgram experiment alone is enough, because you can't simply order someone to commit evil on the scale that you're describing. You need some rationale. Now, the rationale, obviously, in our world, is the Soviet Union. And it seems to me from a tactical point of view, it's okay for the course, because you're giving us data that is absolutely essential to pursue any kind of arguments about policy, but for those of us that try to deal with the resistances to a less detailed account of the data, there is this inevitable rationale which isn't just used by security planners, so-called, but by people in any group they're in. They'll say, well, gees, it's really terrible, but the Russians -- look at the Korean airliner, look -- I mean, you could see that just by pointing to some Russian terrible thing, like the Korean airliner thing, that all the senators, you know, most of the senators, most of the house, vote for any Goddamn weapons. And that mechanism, it seems to me, has to be understood if we're going to get at any kind of a moral self-examination, that device of being able to say, well, it's the Russians. We really wouldn't be this way if it were not for the

Russians. That's what these authorities are now using as the rationale for what you're describing. So we do need some tactics, some way of approaching that kind of argument.

DE: Well, as I say -- see, part of this is that people don't understand how widely flung our first-use threats have been in the past. Most of them have not been against Russians. And that's why they've been kept secret.

QUESTION: Not against Russians?

DE: Not against Russians.

QUESTION: Well, but to Russian-related struggles.

DE: ... but that is described in that Call to Mutiny paper. They've been against Koreans, Indochinese, Chinese, people who were related to the Russians, that is, who were supplied by the Russians, and where the weapon had -- but on the other hand, threats were made secretly from our people, because the public, with all their fear of the Russians, were not expected to endorse those threats. And as a matter of fact, if we could cut out threats against people other than the Russians, we would have cut out most of the immediate threats in the world.

QUESTION: Yeah, but the rationale for the planning that you're describing is the Russians. I mean, that somehow has to ...

justification ...

DE: Ah, but it's not seen as first-use planning, as it is. The notion of -- well, let me say, I think you are pointing to something, by the way, that is very old. It's not new. And it has to be reexamined as a human phenomenon. And that is a willingness to contemplate revenge as a legitimation for practically anything that can be involved. If you look at the way the escalation -- how people descended into the abyss of strategic bombing, one finds that at every step there was rationalization in terms of reprisal and of revenge. As I say, like Hitler's revenge weapons. There were a number of other factors we could go into, but the unexamined notion that if the Soviets do it to us, which, by the way, the Bishops at last had the courage to take on, they were taking on a central notion. They not only went against first use, they actually said, as Christians we are most of us not pacifists. We do not rule out violence in self defense. But we do rule out violence against the innocent in revenge, even in retaliation. And for this, by the way, they were excoriated by a lot of people. This is our basis. But at least they brought the issue out in the open. Somebody who disagrees with them has to be willing to say, we do believe in holding hostages and in killing hostages in vengeance against killing our people. And the Bishops said, as I say, We challenge this. That's our policy. We oppose it. I'm saying the American people have never really been confronted -- I would say until this year, until the Bishops took that position, the

American people have never heard anybody who could be called an authority put into question an American policy of retaliating to an attack on our cities by a deliberate destruction of other peoples' cities. Well, it's been put into question now. So we'll see how Americans react to that. But as far as first use goes, Americans on the whole have not known that we threatened first use. And the reason they haven't known is that no President has been willing to try that one out on the American public. I haven't found, by the way -- John, say you're debating somebody in front of an audience, an unfriendly audience to your position, you're debating somebody who is unfriendly to your position and who perhaps has audience support. Ask him or her to define for you exactly when she would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. And explain that to the audience. And you're not going to find somebody who's in a very easy position. I don't care what the audience is. They're going to have a lot of trouble with that. See, we're talking about first use. You're against a no-first-use policy? Tell me the circumstances under which you would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Maybe they'll come up with some.

But on the other hand, they say, well, who is it who's going to attack us? This is the Mexicans, the Canadians, who? In other words, first use is, actually, it's our real policy. It's not exactly a secret policy, but it's not in the minds of people when they justify our nuclear weapons policies. What that means, I'd say, is -- a willingness -- it's the main thing Milgram points to, but now let me come back to your point --



which is a willingness to let authority define the situation for you. To say, we're buying these weapons because of the Russians, because the Russians are strong and mean, and because we need these weapons to keep us from their attacking us. And the citizens say, Oh, that's why. All right. That's not a very skeptical attitude toward the reasons that are being given, any more than the person who comes into the Milgram experiment is very skeptical about the situation that's described to him. Because, in fact, when you criticize that argument, why these weapons, how will they help against the Russians, it doesn't stand up very well. I'll give one example. There are a lot of Europeans who find it, very uncritically, find it quite plausible at first hearing to say SS20's are very lethal, no? Are they not? Yes. That's plausible, that's true. Then why shouldn't we have Pershings to counter the SS20's? Sounds all right. That's what the government tells us. And I had many people in Europe ask me that. Don't we need Pershings to counter the SS20's? Now, if you, in fact, begin to probe that argument, you say, Do Pershings protect you from SS20's? Do they make the firing of SS20's less likely? Will they stop -- well, that doesn't answer itself, but let me go into that just one minute to show a dialogue that I had with a Bundeswehr Air Force officer who came out to us on the blockade. Very self-confident, very self-assured. He wanted to talk to these peaceniks out here and show them they hadn't really thought about it. What about the SS20's, and the Pershings. I said, oh, tell them. So I went through this dialogue to see how it would go in front of an audience. I said, Will the Pershings

survive an attack by SS20's? No. So I said, So they can't retaliate to an attack by SS20's. How, then, can they deter an attack by SS20's? Do they stop the SS20 warheads in flight? No, we know that. The Pershing is vulnerable to the SS20, right? Yes. So it can't deter an SS20. In fact, since the Pershing is a dangerous and vulnerable weapon, is it not a target for the SS20, which the SS20 has incentive, the Russians have incentive to hit with their SS20 more than they would if there were no Pershings? The Pershing, reasonably interpreted, increases the likelihood that the SS20 will be fired. How, then, does it increase your security?

QUESTION: The argument that was used -- let me just play it out -- the argument that would be used and the ~~4~~^C Snowcroft Commission used and other Administration spokesmen used is the Russians don't want us to have the Pershings deployed; that's a further threat to them. And in the face of that threat they will be more willing to compromise and start scaling down their SS20's. This is the bargaining chip.

DE: Yes, that's an argument.

QUESTION: ... to persuade this whole ~~S~~^Snowcroft Commission, most of them, not all of them, ...

DE: Scopeland. (sp?) Well, the point is, what I'm saying is -- in fact, I would say that we'll see this throughout the

course. My understanding of the way the government constructs these arguments and the way they explain it to themselves is not that they're built entirely out of the air in the sense that they're asserting something that could not work. They're just ignoring enormous parts of the problem which, in balance, you know, may point entirely in a different direction. ^PYes, installing the Pershing, I would say, could have exactly the effect they describe. I can't say it can't. Couldn't prove it can't. I would even say it might. It might have that effect. And the effect is, we put in the Pershing, they say Oh dear, the situation has become more dangerous, we'd better make a deal and get rid of our SS20's. Now, no installation of previous weapons by us has had that effect. On the contrary, it has encouraged the Soviets to build their own weapons of comparable nature. No installation by the Soviets has ever had this effect. We've developed comparable weapons. So it could have that effect, but experience doesn't suggest that's the likely effect. Supposing they do what they've always done in the past, and build weapons like the Pershing, or just more SS20's, as in the past. Then -- and this seems to be the way to expect it, on past behavior -- if that happens, both sides now have weapons that encourage the other to strike first in a crisis. You know these arguments, yourself. That would seem to lower the security of both sides. Now, in other words, putting in the Pershing is making it more likely we will have a nuclear war. That argument is, in fact, hard to argue with, but that raises the question, and now we get to your point. Why are they doing it? Because if what I say is

true, what am I saying about our leadership? Have they missed the implications that I'm suggesting? Or don't they see it? I think they do see it, as a matter of fact. So why, then, are they doing it? Well, one explanation is the one I suggested at the beginning of the sort of quagmire idea. They are not doing it at the top. It is happening. It's not a reasoning process. There's not a purpose. The risks are being taken, but nobody is calculating them. They're being taken because people want to build Pershings for profit, for jobs, for whatever, or because scientists want to take that next step, and so forth. I think these factors operate, but they're not the whole factors. I think there are people at the top who pretty much do see these effects and accept them. Without argument. Now, I mean, without giving evidence for this, let me say what I think is happening and that I think it is a deliberate process. I think statesmen on both sides led by the United States are consciously installing weapons which increase instability in some circumstances. We divide that into two parts. This is, I assert, what is happening. That's what I just said to the Bundeswehr guy, and when you look at it you can see it happening. Both sides are putting in vulnerable threatening weapons that will encourage the other side in certain circumstances -- a crisis, when you fear the other side might strike first -- encourage you to strike first, to get the quick draw, and beat them to the _____. So it makes nuclear war more likely in those circumstances. This is happening, see. I think it's happening rather consciously. What I am about to say

is going to sound implausible. I'm not saying it because it's self-evident. I'll argue it later.

In the absence of alternatives that they see, I think that, in particular, the United States, and to some extent the Soviet Union, is trying to deter crises, that is challenges, of our interests by either the Russians or peoples that the Russians support, by making those crises look unstable. They are increasing the likelihood that a crisis will blow up in order to deter the other side from being willing to get into a crisis with us, in hopes that the Russians will tread very carefully before they give anybody weapons, before they fire with their SAMs, in Syria right now, on our planes that are flying over their SAMs. For fear not that we'll immediately strike Moscow, but that a process will start which will get out of control, which in fact will be out of control, which will flare up, and that will make the Russians back down. And they're doing this because it can work. The Russians can see these problems and may well back down, as they have in the past. They may back down next month. It may work next month. The problem that I see with this is that they may not back down sometime. And that I can imagine our -- I can give many historical examples, reason to believe that our most prudent statesmen could overestimate the Soviet willingness to back down, could make that mistake, and get us into a situation where the thing does blow up. That's what's wrong with the policy. But I'm saying that to some extent they are putting Pershings over there knowing that those Pershings are vulnerable. The Pershings are not there to

keep the SS20's from attacking Europe. The Pershings are there to keep the Russians from using a lesser level of violence for fear that the Pershings will be used first against them. And the Pershings are more likely to be used because they're vulnerable to the SS20's. If the SS20 wasn't there, it would be a little hard to make anyone believe we'd really use those Pershings, because it might blow the world up. But with the SS20's there, and with the Pershings vulnerable to them, the Russians know that one reason we might use them is our fear that we're about to lose them.

QUESTION: That argument's been made, that use them or lose them.

DE: Exactly. That makes the Pershing on land a somewhat more desirable weapon of threat than if it were ^{at} sea and less vulnerable. We already have weapons that can do the job of the Pershing at sea, but we don't have any clear incentive to use them fast in a crisis because they would survive. A Pershing is actually a more threatening weapon. ~~That doesn't make it~~ because it's more vulnerable. The Pentagon knows it's vulnerable, yet they seem to be using it. How about the MX? The MX is now being put in fixed holes. No pretense is being made that it's invulnerable. It's a lot cheaper that way. And since the basic purpose I will say, as you'll see from those papers, the basic purpose of the MX is not to use in a war, it's to prevent a war, as you said, to prevent a World War III. To

prevent the Soviets from doing something that might cause the MX to be used. The Russians will have more fear of the MX if they understand that we might be led to use it for fear of losing it than if we weren't afraid we'd lose it. So it does the job better. But if the Russians don't back down, the risk goes up that it does get used. That's the trouble with all this. If you could believe that all these measures would make everybody walk very, very carefully, and there would be no more wars, and there would be no more incidents, and there would be no more false alarms, and no more accidental shoot downs or anything like that -- 50,000 weapons in the world did not prevent that Korean airliner, but maybe the next 10,000 will mean everyone will be afraid to shoot an airliner down. The next 10,000 will do it. If you believe that, then you could live with the strategy. I'll make another -- here's an empirical assertion which you may find interesting: Statesmen commonly, and I can give many examples of this, overestimate the effect of their violence on the other side, its effect on making them back down. I mean they make precise estimates which are, in fact, quite wrong as to how much violence will do the job, or how much threat will do the job. We can go into why that is, but as a phenomenon it's very, very common. I mean very smart, wise guys with intelligence, and so forth. They very commonly underestimate what it will take to cause the other side to break or to back down. They also underestimate the other side's willingness to strike back and to retaliate. And this may sound like a truism or it may not, but the point is the examples are

very interesting. There are enough examples, for instance, we know, for instance, that naval gunfire that they're using now -- you know, they say we have an awesome array of gunfire in Lebanon right now. I'll give one anecdote. By the way, when then a given level of violence, next rule. Well, if the given level of violence proves not to be adequate, rather than give up that approach, the invariable bureaucratic result is to assume it can be done with a higher level of violence. More violence will do it; we just haven't reached the level yet. They use the five-inch guns. Have you noticed that Marines stopped getting shelled at now that they've started? They've lost more Marines since they used the five-inch guns than before. More have been wounded, actually. And that's not a big surprise to me, somehow. And I don't think we've reached the end of that process. One lesson that I got from my Marine training. We had a history course, we had various history courses in the Marines. But one of them was very truncated. I remember it gave the whole Second World War in one hour. And so the lessons drawn -- and everything had to have a lesson, you know, that we drew from, and which we wrote down in our officer's course. And this one was on naval gunfire, or rather this was the naval gunfire part of World War II. And of course the Marines had always counted, as they are in Lebanon, on the fact that they have this heavy naval gunfire supporting them, sixteen-inch guns, five-inch guns, which the Army can't muster. So they were going against these heavily defended islands that the Japanese had been preparing for twenty years, actually, in

the Pacific. They started out with their naval gunfire on Guadalcanal, so you were going from one campaign to another, and what were the major lessons of each campaign. Okay.

Guadalcanal: major lessons. And you had about four major lessons, but the first one was that two days of naval gunfire is not enough. The idea was the naval gunfire would kill or stun all the people there and you would walk ashore into an essentially undefended beach. So you walked into this hornet's nest. The conclusion was two days of sixteen-inch shelling was not enough. So then they went to Tinian, or someplace. From Tinian they learned the lesson that three-and-a-half days of naval gunfire was inadequate. Then Tarawa. Tarawa, four days of naval gunfire was not enough. In Saipan, seven days of naval gunfire was not enough. In Okinawa -- I mean, this isn't the way it came out, it's just that each point, he got to that point in the lesson and that was the lesson. In Okinawa, the lesson was eleven days of naval gunfire was not enough. And then the war ended, so you never actually found exactly what was enough in the way of naval gunfire. And this is what happened on the strategic bombing ..., that a one-day raid was supposed to do it. It turned out not to be enough, and in the end Well, if I may come now to your question. Having read the Milgram stuff, which, by the way, John, I urge -- now you came in late, so I want to make a special pitch to you -- I'm really urging people to read that book. To buy that book. It's a paperback. Milgram, Obedience Authority. And read the book, even though one feels you've read one article and seen the movie or

something. But the whole book needs reading. But when you've read it, you have a sense that you know now why people obeyed in situations where you've seen them obeyed, this is my reaction. Because the implication in the Milgram -- if you believe it, if you believe in Milgram -- the implication is that people, if they recognize the legitimate authority who may legitimately order some violence, some torture, that they'll do anything in response to that. And if ~~will~~ people will torture on command to that degree, then it's easy to understand why they will do something far more abstract, like shuffle papers that have to do with the bombing campaign in the future. In other words, it shows you the limits of obedience are far broader than you imagined, if you believe the Milgram. But that leaves the question, what about the people giving the orders? Milgram says in his book presumably the motivations of the person giving the orders are entirely different. Let me close with this comment on that. For years I have, as I've come to understand what the people I worked with who were in a leadership position were actually doing behind my back, I came to believe in the last few years the assassinations, the coups, the genocide in Indonesia and elsewhere, that I'd simply totally misunderstood them. On the one hand they must be totally different from who I thought they were, because I couldn't believe that my friends that I thought I'd known could have done this. They must be totally different. And I wasn't quick at all to believe that they'd done these things, but I did finally have to accept that. And moreover, that they were really pretty different from anybody


around, that they really were different. In fact, I was challenged on this recently. In fact, I thought the message was -- and here's an area now which I hope we do explore, because I don't feel I have all the answers on it, by any means. But I'll just tell you where I was two months ago, even, and now where I am today. My thinking has changed.

★★ The more I learned about what these guys actually did, the more I thought they must be somebody special, fairly special, unknown to us, the people who wanted these jobs of high power were more different from us than we could possibly imagine. And they managed to conceal it. Because I assumed, as Milgram does assume, that the people who give such orders must accept responsibility for what they're doing and must have a set of priorities that's just unimaginable to us. You know, to win an election they're prepared to kill any number of people. What kind of people must these be? Or to avoid a tactical defeat of some sort, they're willing to initiate nuclear war. They're


★★ willing to back torturers, knowingly. I was challenged on this by an acquaintance named Ram Dass, late of Harvard, Richard Alpert, who, of course, is in pretty much Eastern philosophy at this point, has for years, which is very reluctant to perceive differences between living beings or entities of any kind. And he challenged me and said, "You know, you talk about these people" and I'd described their decisions, "as if they were a different species. And I said, "Well, now that's unfair" because I had said to the audience we were addressing, "I said they're not a different species." Nevertheless, I was

challenging the notion that there was no we-they aspect to this. Nevertheless, they're not exactly like you and me because this is what they are doing. Would you do this? That's in effect what I was saying. But still I asked myself afterwards, now what do I really believe about these people? I thought about what he'd said and his challenge to me. Because I could see that in the way I walked about them, and indeed the way I'd come to think about them, there was a justification for the way he'd heard me speak. That there was a kind of horror in the way I described what they did, and I felt that, and shock that did imply that they were entirely different from us. So I asked myself, is that what I actually believe? After all, I'm talking that way. Do I believe that the policies would have been entirely different had more or less random people been put in those positions, or that it entirely depended on these personalities. I should be fairer than that. They aren't like everybody. They are not randomly drawn from the population. For one thing, they're men, they're white men, they're late middle-aged, they're wives tend to be quite different from them and their views. So they're not randomly drawn. To be a little fairer, do I believe that people drawn randomly from a pool of candidates for that office, white, middle-aged corporate executives -- which is a fairly large pool, select, but large -- do I really believe they would have behaved all that differently? And when I looked at it and I asked myself I said, no, I don't really believe that. The people who did this really are quite a range of personality types and others, and they are

pretty representative of that group. How, then, to understand the choices they made? Kelman, I think, and I reached the conjectural answer -- now this is conjecture, but in two stages. The first one to say, I haven't really integrated into my own thinking about the leaders what Milgram tells us. He's telling us that followers, a great range of followers will do an awful lot more, that ordinary people will do more to victims than we could have imagined without being abnormal. Maybe I should face the possibility that leaders aren't all that abnormal. Kelman, then, gives an explanation, I think -- and that's why I assigned the two together, asked you to read the two together -- which is very powerful on this. I just spent ten hours with Milgram urging him to read the Kelman and to go over it, because his assumptions were like mine earlier, and they were different. Kelman, in a word, says this, that what he finds with data on what amounts to leader data, what people think they ought to do, he conjectures that leaders see themselves as unaccountable in their roles as leaders in much the same way that the followers do. They see themselves as serving a cause, as representing an organization, just as the others feel they are subordinate to it. They feel their own court (?) of individual preferences are not most relevant. They have a job to do and they have no choice but to do what they do. They are relieved of feelings of guilt in what they're doing. What we would think of as normal feelings of guilt. In much the same way -- it's not exactly the same mechanism, but in a very comparable way to the followers who say, I have no choice but to follow orders. And as somebody



said last time, jokingly, the equivalent thing for the leaders to say, I have no choice but to give these orders. These are my orders that it is my job to give. Think of this as a conjecture, you know, just as a hypothesis. But that they feel themselves too in a way unaccountable, irresponsible, in ways that allow them to do things for the good of the organization which they would not, except as individuals could be done for their own personal benefit, but for the nation, the cause, the organization, it's acceptable, assuming that these things are available and have precedents. And what you can see, by the way, in the raw data, now that I think about it, is, in every case, they can see what seemed to them to be relevant precedents. That's, by the way, where revenge gets in. They do it to us, we do it to them. It gets bigger and bigger, but the differences in that seem marginal. The people don't think of themselves as making qualitative changes in what's available.



QUESTION: I've been thinking, since you started talking this evening, about -- I mean I've actually been trying to think in somewhat different images and metaphors that you're using, and I was thinking about the problem of being a bully, and how a bully, let's say in a classroom, manages to stop being a bully. Which is not always simple, actually. Sometimes it's fairly complicated. And there are sort of comparable stories about gunslingers who begin to complain as they get middle-aged and annoyed with their profession, but they can't quit because there's always somebody else showing up who wants to keep taking

over, only they can't say, well, you take over. They've got to be shot (P). So it's difficult to relinquish. To get out of the game.

(Pavle)

DE: Is there a way of doing it, do you know? How is it done?

QUESTION: Well, I don't know exactly the answer to that. I suppose there are various answers. You leave town, you go to a different classroom. In some circumstances, maybe you can quietly de-escalate. But it also depends on how angry, I think, you've made the people around you and how challenged you are. Part of the reason this came to my mind is that I'm slightly troubled by -- I mean, I'm in agreement with your use of the idea of morality about these weapons. But that's not the only place it applies, certainly. And I feel as though I am riding on the back of a bully. I am part of being a bully. You know, in the Godfather, the youngest son was horrified by his father, objected, wanted no part of it, and ultimately was sucked into the vortex and became even worse than his father. It's an awful story.

DE: That's very relevant. Go ahead.

QUESTION: I think what you're pointing out ties in with John's fundamental question, that is, we have the scapegoating of the Russians, which justifies everything. How does somebody break this scapegoating cycle? Well, there are a few ways. It's not

very easy, but one, in fact, to own (?) the history. As I said, pick on the Russians and say, we've been victimized by our own policy makers, by our fathers. In fact this has been going on consciously and known, and here's the information that has been concealed in this family for all these many years. In some way, however, there is often the fear of a blood letting in that kind of process, whose head's going to roll, who's going to pay, what's going to be done. And then there's also the fear -- that's why I think your example with the bully is so great -- the only thing that blocks that is, Oh my God, meanwhile we've been threatening the Russians and all these other people for all these years. We make them mad. Can we really get out of this game and say it's our fathers' fault? Maybe. Our people understand that. But what about them? They have so many murderers on their side, you know, the heads that are going to roll over there.

QUESTION: See, that's right. It's obedience to authority already presupposes a certain way of thinking about this, which is all right, but the loyalty which has a good, rich, important connotation is also important. I mean, I was trying to imagine, how do I understand it if I discover at some point that my father is in some way a criminal, is in some way deeply unfair or wrong. What do I do about that? How do I cope with that? That's what I'm discovering. That's what you're talking about.

QUESTION: You do get other choices when you have other ...

power, though. In other words, I think one way kids stop being bullies is they have other ways of You don't have to bully somebody else if, in fact, you're compatible with them after a while, ...

QUESTION: Something about that worries me tremendously, and that is that I really do sort of believe for some time, I'm not sure how long, we have been incompatible. I mean, how we live in the world is not really compatible with the interests of the rest of the world.

QUESTION: How do you get nations to take responsibility? That's not a national characteristic. One might argue that nations are structured in order not to take responsibility for actions. I mean our history is that they formed in relation to an external phenomenon, threat, food shortage, enemy, ... and there is something in the very nature of the formation of that kind of group we call nations which is formed psychologically to divest its members of responsibility. It's a very tough problem. That's of the essence, so it takes something very powerful to begin to get a new psychology of what it is to be citizens.

COMMENT: (Inaudible)

DE: You know, every comment that's made is very exciting to me because we could go on. I think they're very rich analogies

that you're drawing, and very pertinent. It makes me realize I've done the talking here, and now I'm keeping you ... wanted to give a sense of what this was all about. If people can -- I especially would like it if people would read some of the -- if they read material beforehand, which of course it wasn't possible to do this time, if we do it for next time we can really do mostly discussion, so that I don't have the feeling that I have to put out information that otherwise it's simply unavailable, it's true in some cases. But I'd love to pursue a lot of these -- in fact, I wouldn't cut it off now. I don't know if people have to leave. I'll just mention two things that come up very fast.

Something that Argentina is facing right now is that they are ruled by people who murdered six thousand people or more in good conscious, organizationally, they did it with discipline, they were given a job to do and they did it. And the question is, how can the soldiers who did that relinquish power and feel that they will not be prosecuted? Are you aware this is going on right now? And they're not getting any guarantees. I think one can infer from that that they aren't going to give power up too quickly. It's hard to give them that guarantee. They're caught on that --

QUESTION: They're trying to grant them amnesty.

DE: They're trying to grant themselves amnesty, see. The Ford technique, sort of. The Argentines would say, well, maybe

nobody died in Watergate, but a lot of people disappeared here, and we're not ready to give that amnesty, which may mean it will be very hard to get civilian rule back. They've got that problem.

But you're right. That question John raised about the Germans, I can say that there is a generation, at least, in Germany and Japan, where I have been very startled to hear how matter of factly it's possible for someone who does not identify themselves as a radical Marxist or a right winger or an enemy of the current society who is able to say in front of a general audience, well, this country was aggressor in two wars. We inflicted these evils -- I've heard this both in Japan and Germany -- we inflicted these evils, therefore we must not be part of this and that. It's part of an argument, and it's very startling to an American, or I think almost any other -- you're not used to hearing anyone say that about their own country. So being defeated in a war, and perhaps occupied by the U.S., allows that possibility. A lot of people in Germany are saying I'm doing what I did now, what I'm doing now, and it's mostly resistance to nuclear weapons because I didn't do what I should have done thirty years ago, or my parents didn't, or we, the Germans, didn't do it. And we must not do that again. Of course, there are a lot of Americans that learned that from Viet Nam and are acting that way. A lot. Another defeat, by the way.

QUESTION: That's a very conscious statement, ...

DE: Oh yeah, that's very open.

Let's keep a note, or I'll make a note, the questions about bullying behavior, the dynamics of that; the gun slinger; the questions of finding out about the father. I'd love to pursue that later. I try to analogize, I try to think, what do we think the Germans should have done in 1934, in 1935 and 1936. It gets into the war and they're right under the gun and you can't do anything, you know, but at the risk of your life, exactly. How about in the years up to the war? What do we really think they should have done? And another thing, what do we think the Jews should have done? And the point of asking that question is not to judge the Jews of that period, or the Germans. They had no precedent, really, no understanding of what they were going through to tell them what they could do and what they should do. But what do we think they would tell us now if they could? I've said this, by the way, in Germany, to a very large audience, and said, at Nuremberg, and I said, because faced with the social catastrophe that we are preparing, we are all Germans now, and we are all Jews. So we do have to learn.